by Koh Zhongwei, Alvin

Continuing Politics of Defence Acquisitions: Singapore and the Hawker Hunters Part 1

The implication of going along with the Singaporeans was that to do so would well place the Kuala Lumpur conference in jeopardy. A row between the local partners at this stage could very well have led to an Australian and New Zealand decision to withdraw from any security arrangement for the area, something the British were keen to avoid. Furthermore, even in the event that the acrimony did not escalate into a row, the sheer scale of the Singaporean purchase could possibly lead to the conclusion on the part of the Australians and New Zealanders that there was little for any contributions on their part.[xx]

The second major problem was logistics. The British would be hard pressed to meet the deadline laid down by Singapore for there were no Hunter Mk. 9s available before 1970 and furthermore, there were many other governments ahead in the queue for these aircrafts. Further complicating the issue was that since the great majority of the Hunter Mk. 9s had been funded by the United States in the first place, such a sale would have to be cleared by the United States, at a time when Congress was starting to wake up to the implications of selling sophisticated weapon systems to Third World countries.[xxi]

Given such teething problems, why then had the British finally given in and consented to the sales in May of 1968? Though it is hard to determine the factors which were more influential in the British final decision, three main factors have been observed.

The first factor was that as important as the future of British interests in the region was, the safe and uneventful withdrawal of British forces from the region was of even greater importance. As Lee pointed to foreign journalists at a luncheon on October 18 1967, the British had only thirty thousand men in Malaysia and Singapore. In disengaging from the region, the British were depending on him and his competence in ensuring that they did not run into a situation similar to Aden, where violence had broken out, due to the locals’ conviction that they had been exploited and then deserted by their colonial master.[xxii]

Furthermore, the British knew very well that the Singaporeans could turn to other sources of supply for alternatives to the Hunter, such as the French Mysteres, as was made clear to the British government prior to Lee’s proposed visit to France in June of 1968.[xxiii] While Lee had claimed that he was willing to purchase British aircraft as the political price of doing so was cheaper than if he got it from those other sources[xxiv], there was nothing the British could have done to stop the Singaporean government from purchasing such fighters.

Finally, the acute dilemma faced by the British was that at a time when they were desperately trying to shore up their economy through protecting the sterling from further devaluation, Singapore had in the early months of 1968 sold sterling for U.S dollar and gold, leading to further devaluation pressure on the sterling. Singapore’s significance was that as a member of the Sterling Area, her behaviour with regards to sterling was being monitored by other countries with sterling reserves, such as Malaysia.[xxv] For it to continue selling Sterling for other currencies could lead to those other countries choosing to sell their own sterling reserves.

While the British had tied their aid of fifty million pounds to Singapore’s effort to protect the sterling, given the critical need of the British to maintain an amicable relationship with Singapore to allow for an uneventful British withdrawal, there was little they could actually do to influence Singapore<. All that was stopping Singapore from selling Sterling was the understanding that the British had struck with Prime Minister Lee.

Thus, given that Lee was under attack by key members of his Cabinet led by Dr. Goh Keng Swee for ‘jeopardising Singapore’s position with his so-called special relationship with British Labour leaders’[xxvi], it was in every bit of British interests not to provide political ammunition for Prime Minister Lee’s critics, making it imperative for the British that the Hunters sales be made a non-issue and that every bit of cooperation be provided to Singapore.

As a result of these considerations, by May 1968, the British finally capitulated following an intense month of negotiations on both sides, with the only British stipulation being that Singapore would not make any public announcements prior to the Kuala Lumpur conference about the acquisitions of the Hunters.[xxvii]

1968 proved a year of mixed blessings for Singapore. It is true that the British, who had been the guarantor of Singapore’s security for the past few decades were finally leaving the island, along with the need to defend itself. However, the British decision to leave in 1968 meant that the Singaporean government possessed bargaining chips that were used to good effect in influencing the British to act in Singapore’s favour. A point to note here is that Singaporean requirement for the Hunters had dated back to 1966 and one of the factors leading to the eventual submergence of that requirement was the strength of British objections. By May 1968, those objections were to be overruled by the convergence of factors that tilted things heavily in Singapore’s favour.

The author is a simple man, with simple dreams, who loves nothing more than a good cup of tea under the stars. An undergraduate finishing his last year in the National University of Singapore, intimidated by the intellectual giants who surround his academic life, he simply wants to finish up on his university education and join the ranks of walking zombies in the working world.

[xxii] FCO 24/298. Address and Responses to Questions by His Excellency Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore to Overseas Writers at Luncheon on October 18, 1967.

[xxiii] FCO 24/117. High Commissioner Singapore to Commonwealth Office. Telegram No. 371, 5 April 1968.

[xxiv] Ibid. Record of Talk between Prime Minister of Singapore and Commonwealth Secretary on 7 April 1968.

[xxv] Ibid. Background Notes; Visit of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew on 20 May 1968, Singapore Sterling.

[xxvi] FCO24/289. Sunday Telegram, Lee attacked by Ministers, 21 January 1968.

[xxvii] FCO24/117. Brief for the PM’s talks with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew on Monday, 27 May 1968. Background Notes: Air Defence and the Supply of other military equipment to Singapore.

Tags: defence acquisitions, Hawker Hunters, Singapore military history

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